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ABSTRACT
As with most aspects of electronic systems and integrated circuits,
hardware security has traditionally evolved around the dominant
CMOS technology. However, with the rise of various emerging
technologies, whose main purpose is to overcome the fundamental
limitations for scaling and power consumption of CMOS technology,
unique opportunities arise also to advance the notion of hardware
security. In this paper, I first provide an overview on hardware
security in general. Next, I review selected emerging technologies,
namely (i) spintronics, (ii) memristors, (iii) carbon nanotubes and
related transistors, (iv) nanowires and related transistors, and (v) 3D
and 2.5D integration. I then discuss their application to advance
hardware security and also outline related challenges.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In our modern age of omnipresent and highly interconnected infor-
mation technology, (cyber)security becomes ever more challenged.
Among many other prominent incidents, e.g., in April 2019, more
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than 885 million records from First American Corporation, includ-
ing bank account details, Social Security digits, etc., were leaked
publicly on the internet [1]. Within the realm of cybersecurity in
general, hardware security in particular is concerned about achiev-
ing security and trust directly within the underlying electronics.
Therefore, hardware security seeks to build up, e.g., so-called root
of trust (RoT) schemes for isolation and attestation of computa-
tion [2–4], or other hardware primitives and protection schemes.
As with most aspects of modern electronic systems and inte-
grated circuits (ICs), hardware security has traditionally evolved
around the dominant complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor
(CMOS) technology. However, with the rise of various emerging
technologies, whose main purpose is to overcome the fundamental
limitations for scaling and power consumption of CMOS technology,
unique opportunities arise also to advance the notion of hardware
security. For example, the use of memristive technology is promis-
ing for the secure management of secret keys [5], which is rather
challenging for CMOS memory technologies.
In this paper, I review initially the fundamentals of hardware se-
curity and prior art for CMOS technology, for both the key domains
of (i) data security at runtime and (ii) confidentiality and integrity of
hardware itself (Sec. 2). Then, I cover the fundamentals of selected,
prominent emerging technologies, namely (i) spintronics, (ii) mem-
ristors, (iii) carbon nanotubes and related transistors, (iv) nanowires
and related transistors, and (v) 3D and 2.5D integration (Sec. 3).
Based on this review, promising matches of emerging technologies
and their properties toward the needs for hardware security are
revealed (Sec. 4). Selected researched and (at least partially) demon-
strated security schemes which are based on emerging technologies
are also discussed in Sec. 4. In Sec. 5, I uncover challenges—and
resulting chances—for future advancements, essentially advocat-
ing for further interdisciplinary efforts, where the physical design
community would want to become more involved as well. Finally, I
conclude in Sec. 6.
2 FUNDAMENTALS OF HARDWARE
SECURITY AND PRIOR ART FOR CMOS
Here, I review the fundamentals and prior art of hardware security
in general.While it should be understood that this paper can provide
only an overview on this vast and fast-growing field, I strive to
cover the most important aspects and seminal protection schemes.
2.1 Data Security at Runtime
The confidentiality, integrity, and available of data processingwithin
electronics is subject to various threat scenarios, like unauthorized
access or modification of data, side-channel and fault-injection at-
tacks, and physical read-out and probing attacks. Next, I provide
an overview on these threats and related countermeasures.
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2.1.1 Unauthorized Access or Modification of Data. Such “bread-
and-butter” attacks are conducted mainly at the software level.
Cryptography represents the most commonly applied protection
scheme, while many hardware security features have been proposed
and implemented as well, e.g., RoT architectures [2–4] or hardware
crypto modules [6] and true random number generators (TRNGs)
to support the latter. However, if not designed and implemented
carefully, such security features become prone to hardware-centric
attacks, e.g., see [7–11]; such attacks are discussed below.
2.1.2 Side-Channel and Fault-Injection Attacks. Side-channel at-
tacks infer information from physical channels which are leaky due
to sensitivities of electronics [12]. For example, it is well-known that
the advanced encryption standard (AES) is vulnerable to power
side-channel attacks when the hardware implementation is un-
protected [7, 10]. For another example, modern processors leak
information through caches and other buffers, related to timing
behaviour, speculative execution, et cetera [13–15].
Most countermeasures apply some kind of “hiding” or masking,
i.e., diffusion of the information leaked through side-channels, by
various means taken from the system level [16] down to gates [17].
Fault-injection attacks induce faults to aid deducing sensitive
information. Therefore, fault injection can also support or advance
side-channels attacks. Fault-injection attacks cover direct, invasive
fault injection, e.g., by laser light [18] or electromagnetic waves
[8, 11], as well as indirect fault injection, e.g., by repetitive writing
to particular memory locations [19] or by deliberate “misuse” of
dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) features [9].
Countermeasures include detection of faults at runtime, e.g., see
[20], and hardening against fault injection at design and manu-
facturing time, e.g., see [21, 22]. Note that distinguishing between
natural and malicious faults is non-trivial [23], which imposes prac-
tical challenges for recovery at runtime.
2.1.3 Physical Read-Out and Probing Attacks. An adversary with
access to equipment used traditionally for failure analysis or in-
spection, like electro-optical probing or focused-ion beam milling
tools [24], can mount quite powerful read-out attacks. Among oth-
ers, these attacks are: probing of transistors andwires [25, 26], either
through the metal layers or the substrate backside; monitoring of
the photon emission induced by CMOS transistor switching [27];
or monitoring of electrical charges in memories [28].
Countermeasures seek to prevent and/or detect the physical
access. Solutions include, e.g., shielding structures in the BEOL [29–
31], deflection or scrambling structures in the substrate [32], and
detector circuitry [33]. Earlier studies such as [34] also considered
formally secure techniques. However, such schemes are subject to
limitations assumed for the attackers, which can become obsolete
and would then render the formal guarantees void.
2.2 Confidentiality and Integrity of Hardware
Besides the severe threats on data security at runtime, as outlined
above, other threats such as reverse engineering (RE), piracy of chip-
design intellectual property (IP), illegal overproduction, counterfeit-
ing, or insertion of hardware Trojans represent further challenges
for hardware security. These threats arise mainly due to the global-
ized and distributed nature of modern supply chains for electronics,
which span across many entities and countries nowadays [35].
A multitude of protection schemes have been proposed, which
can be broadly classified into IP protection, Trojan defense, and
physically-unclonable functions (PUFs). All these schemes seek
to protect the hardware from different attackers, which include
untrusted foundries, untrusted testing facilities, untrusted end-
users, or a combination thereof. Next, I provide an overview on
these schemes; more details can also be found in, e.g., [35, 36].
2.2.1 IP Protection. This subject can be further classified, namely
into logic locking, camouflaging, and split manufacturing. Camou-
flaging and split manufacturing alter the manufacturing process
to protect against malicious end-users and untrusted foundries,
respectively, whereas logic locking works at the design level and
seeks to protect against both, the foundries and the end-users.
Logic locking protects the IP by inserting dedicated locks, which
are operated by a secret key [37]. Without the secret key, logic
locking ensures that the details of the design IP cannot be fully
recovered and the IC remains non-functional. The locks are com-
monly realized by additional logic, e.g., XOR/XNOR gates. Only
after manufacturing (preferably even only after testing [38]) is the
IC to be activated, namely by loading the secret key into a dedicated,
tamper-proof on-chip memory. The realization of such memories
remains under research and development, e.g., see [39]—this fact
represents an obstacle towards wider application of logic locking.
Early works on logic locking considered various heuristics for
insertion of locks [40, 41]. Upon the dissemination of a power-
ful oracle-guided,1 Boolean satisfiability (SAT)-based attack [42],
however, the community had to develop more resilient techniques
as in [43, 44] and others. In turn, these more resilient techniques
stimulated the further development of other attacks, e.g., [45, 46],
some tackling directly the locked netlist itself, without requiring
an oracle, e.g., [47–49].
Camouflaging serves to mitigate RE attacks conducted by mali-
cious end-users. Thus, camouflaging means to alter the layout-level
appearance of an IC in order to protect the design IP. This can be
achieved by dedicated front-end-of-line (FEOL) processing steps,
like manipulation of dopant regions, gate structures, and/or gate
contacts [50–52], but also by obfuscation of the back-end-of-line
(BEOL) interconnects [53]. Camouflaging has been made available
for commercial application, e.g., see the SypherMedia Library [54].
Note that obfuscation is also known in the context of design-time
protection, e.g., by obfuscating finite state machines [55]—such
techniques are orthogonal to camouflaging.
As with logic locking, camouflaging is prone to analytical at-
tacks [50, 56]. In addition, camouflaging may be undermined by
physical read-out and probing attacks outlined above.
Split manufacturing seeks to protect the design IP from untrust-
worthy foundries [57–61]. As indicated by the term, the idea is to
split up the manufacturing flow, most commonly into an untrusted
FEOL process and a subsequent, trusted BEOL process. Note that
split manufacturing has been demonstrated successfully; [62] de-
scribes promising results for a 130nm process split between IBM
1That is, a functional IC is required to obtain valid I/O observations.
and GlobalFoundries, and [61] reports on a 28nm split process run
by Samsung across Austin and South Korea.
For the FEOL facility, a split layout appears as a “sea of gates,”
making it difficult for related adversaries to infer the entire netlist
and its design IP. Still, given that regular, security-agnostic design
tools work holistically on both the FEOL and BEOL, hints on the
omitted wiring can well remain in the FEOL [63, 64].
2.2.2 Trojan Defense. The notion of Trojans is wide-ranging and
requires multiple dimensions for classification [65]—it relates to
malicious hardware modifications that are (i) working at the sys-
tem level, register-transfer level (RTL), gate/transistor level, or the
physical level; (ii) seeking to leak information from an IC, reduce
the IC’s performance, or disrupt an IC’s working altogether; (iii) are
always on, triggered internally, or triggered externally; etc. Trojans
are likely introduced by untrustworthy third-party IP, adversarial
designers, or through “hacking” of design tools [66], or, arguably
even more likely, during distribution and deployment of ICs [67].2
Defense schemes can be classified into (i) Trojan detection dur-
ing design and manufacturing time and (ii) Trojan mitigation at
runtime. The former relies on testing, verification, et cetera [68–
75], whereas the latter relies on dedicated security features for
testability and self-authentication [76], monitoring and detection
of malicious activities [77–81], etc. Besides, logic locking and split
manufacturing can hinder Trojan insertion at manufacturing time,
at least to some degree. That is because an adversary without full
understanding of the layout and its IP cannot easily insert some
specific, targeted Trojans [82].
2.2.3 Physically-Unclonable Functions (PUFs). When applied some
input stimulus, a PUF should provide a fully de-correlated output
response. This response should be reproducible for the very same
PUF, even under varying environmental conditions, but it must
differ across different PUF instances, even for the same PUF design.
PUFs are used for (i) “fingerprinting” or authentication of hardware
or (ii) challenge-response-based security schemes [83–85]. Desired
properties for PUFs are uniqueness, unclonability, unpredictability,
reproducibility, and tamper resilience.
Electronic PUFs represent the dominant class of PUFs, with promi-
nent types of electronic PUFs using ring oscillators, arbiters, bistable
rings, and memories [83–86]. The core principle for such PUFs
is to leverage the process variations inherent to (CMOS) fabrica-
tion, through various dedicated circuitry. However, the resulting
randomness is limited for most PUF implementations; it may be
machine-learned and, thus, cloned [85–88].
Optical PUFs represent another interesting class [84, 89–93]. Here
the idea is to manufacture an “optical token” which, in addition to
structural variations inherently present in selected optical media,
may contain randomly included materials, e.g., nanoparticles. De-
pending on the materials used for the token and the inclusions as
well as the design of the token itself, these phenomena can be highly
chaotic and nonlinear by nature [92, 93]. Hence, optical PUFs are
considered more powerful than electronic PUFs.
2Although it has been projected traditionally as the main scenario, I argue that the
likelihood of Trojans being introduced at fabrication time is rather low. That is be-
cause any such endeavour, once detected, would fatally disrupt the business of the
affected foundry. Therefore, foundries can be expected to employ all technical and
organizational means available to them to hinder modifications by malign employees.
3 FUNDAMENTALS OF SELECTED
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
It should be understood that I can provide only an overview on se-
lected emerging technologies; there are further interesting technolo-
gies, like negative capacitance field-effect transistors (NCFETs) [94]
or photonics [95, 96]. Aside from 3D and 2.5D integration, note that
all selected technologies are realized at the device level; therefore,
these technologies can also be referred to as emerging devices.
The selected technologies are all compatible with CMOS manu-
facturing, at least to some degree. Thus, these technologies appear
promising and practical for the near future, as they can also realize
some hybrid CMOS-emerging electronics. In general, emerging
technologies seek to overcome fundamental limitations for CMOS
regarding scalability and power consumption, among other aspects.
In practice, various technologies are also applied in conjunction,
e.g., the N3XT approach by Stanford University and others leverages
carbon nanotubes and spintronics within 3D ICs [97].
3.1 Emerging Devices
3.1.1 Spintronics. Also known as spin electronics, spintronics dif-
fer from CMOS technology in various aspects [98–103]. First and
foremost, in addition to an electronic charge, the spin of electrons
is leveraged for both computation and storage/memory. Second,
the switching process is non-volatile, magnetoelectric, and subject
to other related phenomena like spin-transfer torque (STT). Third,
spintronics are implemented typically as stack of heavy metals, fer-
romagnets, and/or oxide structures [98–103], but the use of other
materials has been proposed as well, e.g., graphene [104], super-
conducting materials [105], or even organic materials [106]. Still,
manufacturing of spintronics can be made compatible with CMOS
processing [99, 101]. Fourth, in comparison to CMOS, spintronic
devices can offer lower power consumption, built-in memory func-
tionality, built-in reconfigurability, and better scalability [99–102].
Spintronics have been studied in detail for memory [101, 102,
107] and/or logic [98–103, 108] applications. For example, efforts
led jointly by Intel, UC Berkeley, and Berkeley Lab promote a type of
magnetoelectric spin-orbit logic that has superior switching energy
(by a factor of 10 to 30), lower switching voltage (by a factor of 5),
and enhanced logic density (by a factor of 5) when compared to
CMOS. Among other applications, reconfigurable logic, probabilis-
tic computing, and in-memory computing are good matches for
spintronics [101, 108, 109].
3.1.2 Memristors. The memristor, short for memory resistor, repre-
sents another fundamental circuit element besides the well-known
resistor, capacitor, and inductor elements; its theory was studied
already in 1971 [110]. Memristors retain an internal resistive state
according to the history of voltage or current applied. Another
interesting characteristic for some but not all memristors is a non-
linear response, resulting in “pinched hysteresis loops.” That is,
such memristors exhibit a current/voltage threshold, with their
internal state only being switched when this threshold is exceeded.
The implementation of memristor devices remains under re-
search and development, considering various materials and ar-
rangements like titanium dioxide [111], spintronics [112], or carbon
nanotubes [113], with most approaches remaining compatible with
CMOS fabrication. Memristive systems in the broader sense, like
resistive random-access memories (ReRAMs) or even phase-change
memories (PCMs),3 are progressing towards commercial applica-
tion [118, 119]. Aside from memory, memristors are also interesting
for in-memory computing, neuromorphic computing, and reconfig-
urable logic [115, 120, 121].
3.1.3 CarbonNanotubes and Transistors. Carbon nanotubes (CNTs)
comprise one or more rolled-up layers of graphene, the planar ar-
rangement of single-layer carbon atoms in 2D honeycomb-like
structures. In other words, CNTs form cylindrical structures with
single or multiple “walls” made of carbon sheets. CNTs are typi-
cally few nanometers in diameter and few micrometers in length.
CNTs can be either metallic conductors or semiconductors, depend-
ing on their structure. CNTs exhibit outstanding electrical, phys-
ical, and thermal properties [122–124], mainly due to the strong
bonds between their carbon atoms. For example, individual metallic
CNTs can, in principle, hold current densities more than 1,000 times
greater than copper, which is also promising to mitigate electromi-
gration [124]. In practice, however, CNTs have to form interfaces
with each other and with other materials [122, 123, 125, 126], push-
ing such gains somewhat out of reach. Still, one can also build up
composite structures to tune CNT properties as needed, e.g., using
copper to adapt the thermal expansion coefficient of CNTs toward
that of silicon [127].
CNTs have been studied extensively for interconnects, e.g., see
[122, 123, 126], as well as for transistors, e.g., see [97, 125, 128, 129].
In essence, carbon nanotube field-effect transistors (CNTFETs or
CNFETs) leverage multiple CNTs as transistor channels, which can
be realized in different arrangements, e.g., as gate-all-around struc-
ture [130]. CNTFETs are subject to the imperfection and variability
of CNTmanufacturing. However, these limitations can be addressed
by device and chip-design methodologies [131]—chip-scale applica-
tion of CNTFETs has been demonstrated successfully [128, 129].
3.1.4 Nanowires and Transistors. Nanowire FETs (NWFETs) lever-
age nano-scaled and semiconductive wires as transistor channel.
Various types of NWFETs have been studied, e.g., using silicon [132],
indium arsenide [133], germanium, or even polymers [134] for
materials; homogeneous or heterogeneous wire structures [135];
gate-all-around [136] or vertical gate structures [133]; et cetera—an
overview can also be found in [135]. Conceptionally, NWFETs are
somewhat similar to CNTFETs, but NWFETs allow for finer control
of desired properties during manufacturing (albeit challenges for
chip-scale manufacturing are there as well [135]), whereas CNT-
FETs offer better performance [137]. Besides, NWFETs are some-
what similar to nanosheet transistors, which are progressing already
towards commercial application [138].
Nanowire transistors have been proposed for sensing applica-
tions [139], flexible electronics [135], and reconfigurable logic [132],
among other applications. For [132], an additional program gate
enables to switch the transistor between n-channel and p-channel
behavior, by selectively suppressing the injection of one type of
charge carriers (e.g., electrons), while the other type (e.g., holes) is
modulated via the control gate.
3While some argue that such related technologies should be considered as memristive
ones as well [114, 115], others argue against that and for a more strict interpretation
of memristive properties in general [116, 117].
3.2 3D and 2.5D Integration
Aside from the emerging devices outlined above, 3D and 2.5D in-
tegration targets at the system level. That is, these technologies
embrace notions of “building skyscrapers” or “city clusters” of elec-
tronics [140–143]. Two factors drive these technologies: for one,
that is the CMOS scalability bottleneck, which becomes more exac-
erbated for advanced nodes by issues like routability, pitch scaling,
and process variations, for another, that is the need to advance
heterogeneous and system-level integration. Both drivers are also
known as “More Moore” and “More than Moore,” respectively.
3D integration means to vertically stack and interconnect mul-
tiple chips or active layers. This approach can be classified by the
underlying technology, with the main ones being (i) through-silicon
via (TSV)-based 3D ICs, (ii) face-to-face (F2F) 3D ICs, and (iii) mono-
lithic 3D (M3D) ICs [140]. Various studies, prototypes, and commer-
cial products have shown that such 3D ICs offer significant benefits
over 2D ICs, e.g., see [143–146].
2.5D integration, otherwise known as interposer technology, facil-
itates system-level integration of 2D/3D ICs in side-by-side fashion.
That is, an interposer serves as integration carrier, accommodates
some system-level interconnect fabric, and may even contain active
components [147–153]. Building advanced electronic systems in
the form of 2.5D ICs is considered less complex than 3D integra-
tion [147, 150, 153]. That is also because interposers are typically
implemented using mature technology nodes, for cost savings and
yield management. Finally, 2.5D ICs are already well-established in
the market, e.g., see [146, 154].
4 EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES FOR
HARDWARE SECURITY
Various emerging technologies offer the potential to advance the
notion of hardware security. In Fig. 1, I outline the selected emerging
technologies covered in this paper, their properties relevant and
beneficial for hardware security, the security schemes which are
supported accordingly, and the security threats countered by such
schemes. While this illustration is certainly not an overarching one,
it does consider all the aspects introduced in this paper.
4.1 Emerging Devices
The reviewed emerging devices have some interesting proper-
ties in common, which are more difficult to achieve in traditional
CMOS technology. More specifically, spintronics, memristors, CNT-
FETs, and NWFETs can all be tailored to comprise significant vari-
ability/randomness, reconfigurability or polymorphic behavior, re-
silience against reverse engineering, and possibly also for separa-
tion of trusted and untrusted parts (the latter by means of split
manufacturing). Therefore, these devices can serve well for PUFs,
TRNGs, IP protection schemes, and to mask side-channel leakage.
Moreover, memristors may also offer resilience against tampering,
by means of destructive data management [5].
It should be understood that the prospects for actual implemen-
tation of such security schemes based on emerging devices depends
on various aspects, ranging from circuit design and security analysis
in general, down to manufacturing capabilities and device maturity,
among others. Still, there is a wide range of prior art developing and
promoting such schemes, of which some are reviewed next. Note
Figure 1: A selective overview on emerging technologies, their properties, matching security schemes, and countered threats.
that other papers have reviewed emerging devices in the context
of hardware security as well, e.g., see [155–157].
4.1.1 Spintronics. Various studies proposed polymorphic behavior
and/or reconfigurability for IP protection. For example, Alasad et
al. [158] use all-spin logic for camouflaging. However, the layouts
for some of their proposed device primitives are unique; they can
be readily distinguished during imaging-based reverse engineer-
ing. Besides, their primitives suffer from relatively high energy
consumption, with around 350 µW consumed for ns-range delays.
In [159, 160], the authors introduced spintronics-based reconfig-
urable lookup tables (LUTs) for design obfuscation. However, these
approaches can fall short regarding their resilience against SAT at-
tacks [161]. Also note that such approaches are conceptionally simi-
lar to design obfuscation leveraging traditional field-programmable
gate arrays (FPGAs). In [162] and [161, 163], polymorphic and obfus-
cated logic has been studied, based on domain-wall motion devices
and on giant spin-Hall effect (GSHE) devices, respectively. One
important benefit of the latter studies over the former is that they
support all 16 possible functions per device; this renders these
devices superior in terms of SAT resilience [161, 163].
In [164], the notion of “dynamic camouflaging” based on poly-
morphic magnetoelectric spin-orbit (MESO) devices has been intro-
duced. Unlike regular camouflaging, this notion can also protect
against adversaries in the foundries and test facilities, as the true
functionality is configured only later on within the polymorphic
fabric. Thus, this notion is also conceptionally similar to logic lock-
ing; however, unlike with locking, no additional devices or gates
are required to realize this kind of security.
It has been noted that spintronics can offer some resilience
against side-channel attacks [161, 164, 165]. For example, themagne-
toelectric switching of these devices does not emit photons; related
attacks as in [27] can be ruled out to begin with. With spintronics
used for logic, fault-injection and side-channel attacks based on
magnetic fields or temperature curves may be more difficult to
achieve [161, 164], unlike with spintronics used for memories [156].
Moreover, in [165] the authors used spintronics to build up poly-
morphic circuitry and different circuit templates for the same func-
tionality, which are randomly switched between at runtime, in
order to mask the power side-channel.
In [156, 166], the authors advocate the process variations for
nanowire manufacturing in domain-wall memories for PUFs. In
[167], the authors leverage the inherently stochastic spin switching
mechanism in nanomagnets for TRNGs. Through device-level sim-
ulations, the authors demonstrate that their TRNG device works
across large temperature ranges, is immune to process variations,
and can be implemented with significantly smaller layout costs than
CMOS TRNGs. In [168], the authors propose an antiferromagnets-
based secure memory scheme, which offers protection against tam-
pering, side-channel, and read-out attacks, and also promises orders
of lower energy-per-bit than STT-RAM or PCMs.
Most studies focus on circuit design and security analysis, but few
on technology aspects. While spintronics are making fast progress
toward application, it seems important to consider technology ex-
ploration also within the concerned security studies.
4.1.2 Memristors. The potential of using memristors for hardware-
security schemes has been recognized already some years ago,
e.g., for PUFs leveraging the process variations and the stochastic
operation of memristors in 2013 [169]. More recently, another PUF
concept has been proposed [170], which leverages the non-linear
I-V characteristics of memristors (“pinched hysteresis”) and applies
analogue tuning of the memristor conductance, to increase the
performance of such PUFs and to reduce the complexity of the
peripheral circuitry. The authors of [170] provided an experimental
demonstration and measurement results for their PUF concept.
In [5], a memristive crossbar array is at the heart for secure
management of secret keys. The authors propose to combine unique
fingerprints of memristor devices with storage of key values within
those devices. They construct control circuitry such that upon
extraction of the fingerprints (for verification of authenticity of the
chip), the key is destroyed. Therefore, the secret key remains “alive”
on the chip to enable its functionality (following the notion of logic
locking) until any read-out is conducted. The authors of [5] provide
an experimental demonstration and measurement results for their
concept. Such a concept is an important step for the practicality
of logic locking, which requires tamper-proof memories for its
security promises against malicious end-users in the field.
In [171], the authors propose polymorphic circuitry for obfusca-
tion also in the context of memristors. That is possible because, in
principle, the functionality of memristor devices within such obfus-
cated logic can be reconfigured. While the authors provide a first
study at the circuit and layout level—albeit without details on the
technology exploration and library characterization—they do not
provide any experimental demonstration. Moreover, other studies
caution about delay and power consumption for memristor-based
logic unless circuit structures are optimized [172], which seems to
conflict with obfuscation principles.
4.1.3 CNTs and CNTFETs. In [173], the authors propose PUFs
which leverage the manufacturing variability of CNTs along with
the notion of Lorenz chaotic systems. The latter serves to enhance
the decorrelation of inputs and outputs for such PUFs and, thus,
renders them more resilient against machine-learning attacks.
In [174], the authors conduct a simulations-based study on CNT-
FETS concerning Trojan detection, power side-channel leakage,
and camouflaging, and they find that CNTFETs are more promising
in all aspects when compared to the traditional CMOS technology.
In [157], the authors review the use of CNTS for PUFs, TRNGs,
and also propose the technology to be used for novel sensors de-
tecting microprobing or other invasive attacks.
4.1.4 Nanowires and NWFETs. In [175], the authors propose sili-
con NWFETs for camouflaging. More specifically, they leverage the
controllable ambipolarity in NWFETs to build up a camouflaging
primitive comprising the NAND, NOR, XOR, and XNOR function-
alities. The authors also build up a polymorphic NAND/NOR gate,
and they present circuit-simulation results. In [161], however, it
was shown that such primitives are prone to SAT attacks. In [132],
the authors indicate that their concept of reconfigurable NWFETs
can also be used for hardware security, among other applications,
but they do not provide further details.
In [176, 177] the use of nanowires with plasmonics interaction
upon optical inspection is proposed and experimentally demon-
strated. This idea serves for labelling and authentication of chips
(or other goods, for that matter). Loosely related, because without
Table 1: Selected Works Leveraging 2.5D/3D Integration for
the Benefit of Hardware Security
Reference Style Scope; Means Trusted Part
[181] TSV Runtime monitoring; Whole 3D ICsplit manufacturing (SM)
[182] 2.5D IP protection; SM Interposer
[82] 2.5D Trojan prevention; SM Interposer
[183] F2F IP protection; SM, camouflaging Parts of 3D IC
[184] M3D IP protection; camouflaging Whole 3D IC
[185] F2F IP protection, Trojan prevention; Only BEOLSM, camouflaging
[186] TSV Probing protection; enclosure Whole 3D IC
[187, 188] TSV Side-channel mitigation; enclosure Whole 3D IC
[4] 2.5D Runtime monitoring; separation Interposer
the need for nanowires, the authors in [93] proposed the concept of
plasmonics-enhanced optical PUFs and provide physical-simulation
results and a security analysis.
4.2 3D and 2.5D Integration
The main benefits provided by 3D and 2.5D integration to advance
hardware security are (i) the physical separation of components, be
it across interconnects, active devices, or both, and (ii) the physical
enclosure of components, to shield them from adversarial activities
in the field. In Table 1, I summarize selected works; I discuss these
and others in some detail next. Note that other papers have reviewed
the benefits and fallacies for hardware security arising by 3D and
2.5D integration as well, e.g., see [178–180].
4.2.1 Confidentiality and Integrity of Hardware: Logic Locking. To
the best of our knowledge, 3D and 2.5D integration has not been
explored yet for logic locking. In the loosely related work [189], the
authors leverage locking principles to advance the notion of split
manufacturing. More specifically, they lock the FEOL and delegate
the unlocking to a separate, trusted BEOL facility. The authors note
that their scheme can also be unlocked at the package or board
level, which might well suggest an implementation as 2.5D IC.
4.2.2 Confidentiality and Integrity of Hardware: Camouflaging. The
authors of [184] were the first to propose camouflaging dedicatedly
for 3D integration, more specifically for M3D ICs. The authors
developed and characterized custom M3D camouflaged libraries,
and they evaluated their scheme at the gate level and at chip scale.
The camouflaging is realized by dummy contacts, which has
been proposed previously for camouflaging in classical 2D ICs.
Thus, while conceptionally not new, the work in [184] leverages
the benefits provided by M3D ICs in an effort to advance the scal-
ability of camouflaging. That is noteworthy because prior art for
camouflaging may incur considerable layout cost. For example, the
NAND-NOR-XOR primitive of [50] would incur 5.5× power, 1.6×
delay, and 4× area cost compared to a regular NAND gate.4 In con-
trast, the work in [184] report on average only 25% power cost, 15%
delay cost, and 43% area savings compared to regular 2D gates.
4.2.3 Confidentiality and Integrity of Hardware: Split Manufactur-
ing. To advance split manufacturing via 3D and 2.5D integration
seems both straightforward and promising. That is because 3D
4In practice, such cost allow for only few gates being camouflaged. Overly limited
camouflaging scales, in turn, renders such schemes prone to SAT attacks [46, 56].
and 2.5D integration allows to split a design into multiple chips,
which can maintain their FEOL and BEOL layers independently as
is, whereas the overall 2.5D/3D stack can comprise further parts
of the system-level interconnects. Moreover, concerns regarding
the practicability of classical split manufacturing—which are still
prevalent, despite proof-of-concept studies like [61, 62]—can be
elevated due to this very fact that individual chip would not have
to be split manufactured, but only the overall system.
The idea of such “3D split manufacturing” was outlined in 2008,
by Tezzaron Semiconductor [190]. Various studies are hinting at 3D
split manufacturing as well, but most have some limitations. For ex-
ample, the study [180] remains only on the conceptional level, while
the studies [82, 182] utilize 2.5D integration with “only” wires being
hidden from untrusted facilities. The latter is in principal equivalent
to traditional split manufacturing but seems more practical; still,
the studies [82, 182] report on considerable layout cost. Later on,
[183, 185, 191, 192] promoted “native 3D split manufacturing,” i.e.,
with logic being split across trusted and untrusted facilities.
One important finding of those later studies [183, 185, 191, 192]
is that the 3D partitioning as well as the vertical interconnect fabric
both play an important role and define a cost-security trade-off as
follows: the more the design is split up across multiple chips, the
higher the layout cost, due to the need for more vertical intercon-
nect links and related circuitry, but the more flexible and easier it
becomes to “dissolve” the IP across the 3D stack.
Note that [183, 185, 192] proposed 3D split manufacturing in
conjunction with camouflaging. While the study [183] applies reg-
ular, FEOL-centric camouflaging, the studies [185, 192] argue that
another camouflaging approach is more appropriate for 3D split
manufacturing, namely the obfuscation of the vertical interconnects.
Other works also suggest camouflaging at the system level. For ex-
ample, [193] proposed to obfuscate the vertical interconnect fabric
of 3D ICs by rerouting within dedicated network-on-chip (NoC)
chips “sandwiched” between the regular chips. This idea is concep-
tionally similar to the notion of randomized routing in [185, 192],
but more flexible, yet also more costly—it seems only warranted in
case 3D NoCs are to be employed in any case.
4.2.4 Confidentiality and Integrity of Hardware: Trojan Defense.
In [185], the authors leveraged the benefits provided by 3D split
manufacturing to advance the formally-secure but high-cost scheme
of [82] to mitigate Trojan insertion at manufacturing time.
Besides, 3D and 2.5D ICs seem rather more vulnerable than 2D
ICs to Trojan insertion during design and manufacturing time. For
example, the study in [194] considered the negative bias tempera-
ture instability (NBTI) effect as stealthy Trojan trigger, motivated by
the fact that thermal management is a well-known challenge for 3D
ICs. In a more general manner, I caution that the broader landscape
of suppliers and actors involved with 3D and 2.5D integration can
open up new opportunities for attackers to embed Trojans. Such
a concern has also been voiced recently in [195], along with the
wide-spread notion of wafer-level chip-scale packaging (WLCSP).
The hypothesized attack here is that some malicious fabrication
or integration facility could place a thin Trojan chip between the
target chip and the package microbumps, while that Trojan chip
would contain TSVs to both pass-through and tap into those exter-
nal connections, gaining access to all signals at will. To mitigate
detection by visual or X-ray inspection, it was argued that aligning
those TSVs with the microbump locations might suffice.
Trojan detection at runtime, however, can benefit from 3D and
2.5D integration. That is because related security features can be
implemented separately using a trusted fabrication process and
integrated/stacked later on with the commodity chip(s) to be moni-
tored [4, 81]; see also the discussion on data security below.
4.2.5 Confidentiality and Integrity of Hardware: PUFs. The integra-
tion of multiple chips into 3D/2.5D stacks seems beneficial for the
notion of PUFs, as the individual chips are subject to independent
process variations. Thus, one can build up PUFs using multiple, in-
dependent sources of entropy. In [196, 197], two such schemes have
been proposed, which further leverage the process variations of
TSVs. While promising in principle, these studies did not consider
state-of-the-art machine learning attacks like [85–88]; their actual
resilience remains yet to be demonstrated.
4.2.6 Data Security at Runtime: Unauthorized Access or Modifica-
tion of Data. 3D and 2.5D integration enables physical separation of
components and, thus, allows for trustworthy realization of security
features like runtime monitors [4, 181, 198] or verifiers [81].
Still, I caution that the physical implementation of such schemes
may become a vulnerability by itself. In [181], for example, the
authors propose introspective interfaces which, however, require
additional logic within the commodity chip to be monitored. It is
easy to see that these interfaces would fail once they are modified by
some malicious actor(s) involved with the design or manufacturing
of that commodity chip. Thus, an undesirable dependency arises,
possibly thwarting the scheme altogether. Note that the authors
themselves acknowledge this limitation in [181].
In [4], a 2.5D root of trust has been proposed, which integrates un-
trusted commodity chips/chiplets onto an active interposer which
contains security features and further forms the backbone for
system-level communication between the chips/ciplets. Thus, a
clear physical separation into commodity and security components
exists, avoiding any security-undermining dependencies.
4.2.7 Data Security at Runtime: Side-Channel and Fault-Injection
Attacks. In general, side-channel attacks seem to become more
difficult for 3D and 2.5D ICs, considering the higher density of active
devices and the more complex circuit structures and architectures,
which can result into more noisy side-channels. For example, the
authors of [199] studied power side-channel attacks on 3D ICs, and
they observed that the power noise profiles from the different chips
within the 3D IC are superposed. They also propose a randomized
cross-linking scheme of voltage supplies toward cryptographic
modules, to render attacks more difficult.
Some prior art also studied side-channel attacks targeted ex-
plicitly for 3D ICs. For example, [200] and [187] demonstrate that
thermal side-channel attacks on 3D ICs can be mitigated at runtime
and at design time, respectively. However, the approach in [200]
seems less practical; to mitigate information leakage through ther-
mal patterns, it leverages dynamic generation of additional dummy
activities, which exacerbates the challenge of thermal management
for 3D ICs naturally further. In contrast, the authors of [187] model
the impact of TSVs and module placement on heat distribution
as well as thermal leakage during floorplanning, thereby enabling
leakage mitigation along with reduction of peak temperatures.
Besides, some studies leverage 3D and 2.5D integration to ad-
vocate for security schemes otherwise considered too costly. For
example, the study in [201] leverages randomized eviction and het-
erogeneous latencies for a cache architecture. The authors demon-
strate that such techniques incur high performance overheads in
2D ICs but can be realized even with gains in 3D ICs.
As with side-channel attacks, fault-injection attacks may become
more difficult, due to the physical encapsulation of 3D/2.5D ICs.
Still, in [202] it was shown recently that a lateral re-arrangement
of the laser setup can suffice to enable such fault-injection attacks
also for backside-protected 2D ICs and possibly also for 2.5D and
3D ICs. However, with a dedicated physical design of 3D ICs, e.g.,
placing TSVs densely at the chip boundaries, forming a “vertical
shield” structure [178], along with regular shields in the BEOL and
backside protection, even such attacks might remain difficult.
4.2.8 Data Security at Runtime: Physical Read-Out and Probing
Attacks. Similar to fault-injection attacks, the notion of physical
enclosures enabled by 3D/2.5D integration may hinder read-out
and probing attacks. In [178], the authors argued for “all around
shields” enabled by 3D ICs. Similar protection against probing has
been discussed before in [186, 203]. While powerful in principle,
such schemes are yet to be demonstrated in practice.
5 CHALLENGES FOR HARDWARE SECURITY
USING EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
As with any security scheme, also those relying on emerging tech-
nologies face some challenges. I have outlined specific limitations
and challenges for selected prior art already in the discussion above,
but here I seek to take a broader view.
Possibly the most important and complex challenges arise from
the fact that security schemes in general and those based on emerg-
ing technologies in particular rely on proper technology explo-
ration, device characterization and modeling, circuit architectures,
design strategies, etc. While security schemes tailored for CMOS
technology can leverage well-defined and well-characterized tech-
nology libraries, state-of-the-art design tools,5 etc., this is not so
straightforward for most emerging technologies, as their charac-
terization and design support is still progressing. However, the
resulting challenges may—and should—be rather considered as
chances, namely to incorporate security as best as possible right
from the beginning, and not only as an afterthought, as we often
see for security schemes using CMOS technology.
To do so, I propose that the following steps, among others and
not necessarily in that particular order, are to be considered:
(1) Establish closer interaction between the communities work-
ing on hardware security, physical design, and emerging
technologies. I argue that a collaborative exchange between
our communities is essential for any advancement.
(2) (Re-)definition of security metrics and joint “translation” of
those metrics. Only then can the emerging-technology com-
munities consider hardware security in a proper, quantifiable
5Even in the context of classical CMOS technology, there are still a plethora of chal-
lenges to be addressed to make design tools more security-aware [204].
manner during technology exploration and device design.
For example, while the correlation of switching activities and
power consumption (for estimation of power side-channel
leakage) seems rather easy to model also for emerging tech-
nologies, the commonly promoted criteria for PUFs, like
uniqueness or unpredictability, are highly device-specific
and require “translation” for effective modeling.
(3) Joint reconsideration of threat models. With the progression
of emerging technologies, it can be expected that further fal-
lacies, possibly yet unexplored, come into play. For example,
advanced tools for failure analysis of emerging technologies
can be “misused” for physical attacks in the field. For secu-
rity schemes based on CMOS technology, we have seen this
with the proliferation and wider availability of, e.g., electron
microscopy [73] and electro-optical probing [27].
(4) Technology exploration, prototyping, and joint evaluation
of securities schemes based on emerging technologies. That
is also because process variations are expected to be more
pronounced for most emerging technologies. For PUFs, e.g.,
stronger variations would serve well for uniqueness/entropy,
but hinder reproducibility. Only once such empirical insights
are available it would seem possible to devise, e.g., error
correction schemes to improve the reproducibility.
(5) Since most emerging technologies are being promoted for
CMOS integration, it becomes important to determine the
“weakest link(s) in the chain” for such hybrid implementa-
tions of security schemes. These efforts should range from
device to circuit to system level, and should also revise re-
lated design strategies as needed. Somewhat related, note
that the composition of security schemes remains a challenge
even for CMOS-only ICs; the physical-design community
should become more involved here as well [204].
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have reviewed the fundamentals of hardware security
in general and discussed selected prior art. I have further reviewed
selected emerging technologies, namely (i) spintronics, (ii) memris-
tors, (iii) carbon nanotubes and related transistors, (iv) nanowires
and related transistors, and (v) 3D and 2.5D integration. I have
discussed how these technologies are promising to advance various
aspects of hardware security, and I have also reviewed related early
studies and some of their limitations.
Many of the security schemes based on emerging technologies
still require more collaborative efforts and practical validation—
which is not to be taken as pessimistic statement, rather as call to
our communities for joint action.
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